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Abstract
How can retirement savings be increased? We explore a unique policy change
in the context of the German pension system to study this question. As
of 2004, the German pension authority started to send out annual letters
providing detailed and comprehensible information about the pension system
and individual expected pension payments. This reform did not change the
level of pensions, but only manipulated the knowledge about and salience
of expected pension payments. Using German tax return data, we exploit
two discontinuities in the age cuto↵s of receiving such a letter to study their
e↵ects on private retirement savings. Our results show that the letters increase
private retirement savings. The e↵ects are fairly sizable and persistent over
several years. We further show that the letter increases labor earnings, and
that the increase in savings partly crowds out charitable donations. Moreover,
we present evidence suggesting that both information and salience drive the
savings e↵ect. Our paper adds to a recent literature showing that policies that
go beyond the traditional neoclassical reasoning can be powerful to increase
savings rates.
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1 Introduction
Life expectancies steadily increase and the average age of populations rises in most
industrialized countries. This development has severe implications for pension sys-
tems and there is concern that individual savings for retirement are not su cient
(Benartzi and Thaler 2013; Poterba 2014).1 An important question then is how
retirement savings can be increased in order to guarantee adequate old-age income
for all individuals. In e↵orts to improve retirement savings many governments spend
large amounts of money to subsidize savings in retirement accounts. The empirical
literature regarding the e↵ect of such ”traditional” subsidy policies is mixed; indi-
viduals’ savings behavior does not seem to respond to saving subsidies in the way a
neoclassical incentive model would predict (see Chetty 2015 and references therein).
A series of recent studies, however, show that ”less traditional” policies can be more
e↵ective to increase savings. For example, there is robust evidence that changing
the default in the decision whether to contribute to a retirement account or not is
very e↵ective in increasing savings (Madrian and Shea 2001; Thaler and Benartzi
2004; Chetty et al. 2014).
In this paper, we study another type of “less traditional” policy that may help
to increase individual savings for retirement. We explore a policy change in Ger-
many which increased the information about future pensions payments and made
the issue of retirement more salient to individuals. The German pension system is
complicated and it is therefore di cult to develop precise expectations about future
pension payments.2 In an e↵ort to increase transparency, the German public pension
authority implemented a reform which changed the way information about retire-
ment savings are provided. In particular, as of 2004 the pension authority started
to send out annual letters which provide detailed and comprehensible information
about the pension system in general and individual expected pension payments.
For example, the letters inform recipients about the individual date of statutory re-
tirement and the pension payments that they can currently expect upon retirement.
The letters also nudge individuals to save more through private retirement accounts.
Importantly, the letter reform did not change the level of retirement payments, but
it only manipulated the knowledge about and salience of pension payments.
1We study the case of Germany, where it is generally acknowledged that more private retirement
savings are necessary to maintain an adequate level of income for the elderly (see, for example, the
government report in German Federal Government 2012).
2For example, using evidence on expected replacement rates of the public pension from the
SHARE survey combined with administrative records from the German pension insurance, we
show that about two thirds to three quarters of employees tend to overestimate their expected
public pension – see Section 6 for details.
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We use German tax return data from administrative records to study the
e↵ect of information letters on private retirement savings. We use two strategies to
identify the e↵ect of the letters: (i) a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) approach where
we exploit two discontinuities in the age cuto↵s of receiving such a letter or not. In
particular, prior to the 2004 reform, all employees older than 55 already received
information about their retirement payments whereas employees younger than 55 did
not receive any information. Since those age groups that always received a letter did
not experience a shock in information or salience, we use them as a control group
for slightly younger age groups who started to receive the letter in the course of
the reform. In addition, not all employees were a↵ected by the reform. Subjects
eligible to receive the letter are older than 27 years old and have paid social security
contributions for at least five years. Younger (or less experienced) individuals can
therefore serve as a control group for age groups slightly older than 27. Using quasi-
random variation around these age cuto↵s, we rely on a DiD design where we follow
the di↵erently a↵ected age groups over time. (ii) As a complement to the DiD
design, we follow an event-study approach which uses that, at the young age cuto↵,
di↵erent taxpayers start receiving letters at di↵erent points of time. Using within-
person variation over time, we study how savings developed after (and before) a
letter is received.
From a neoclassical perspective with full information and purely rational indi-
viduals, these letters should not a↵ect retirement savings because incentives remain
the same and the amount of future pension payments does not change.3 However, the
reform relates to recent empirical evidence showing that better information about
institutional details and more salient policies can have significant e↵ects on behav-
ior.4 In the context of retirement savings, Goda et al. (2014) conduct a randomized
field experiment to study the e↵ects of providing income projections along with
general planning information about employer-provided retirement accounts. Their
results indicate that contributions to the retirement accounts are a↵ected by pro-
jections and planning materials, but the projections alone do not have a significant
e↵ect. Duflo and Saez (2003) conduct a field experiment in which randomly chosen
3 Mastrobuoni (2011) shows that in the US context workers do not change their retirement
behavior after receiving the annual Social Security Statement. Haupt (2014) reports that 12% of
survey respondents in Germany stated that they increased (or planned to increase) savings upon
receiving the information letter. Using administrative data and an identification strategy that
allows causal inference, we study if these survey responses translate into actual behavior.
4 For example, Bhargava and Manoli (2015) use a randomized experiment in the context of
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US to show that providing simplified information
about the EITC has a significantly positive e↵ect on the take-up of EITC benefits. Finkelstein
(2009) provides evidence that a policy which decreased the salience of driving-toll rates a↵ects the
elasticity of driving w.r.t. to the toll rates, and Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers are not
responsive to taxes that are not salient.
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individuals are provided monetary incentives to attend seminars that inform about
a specific retirement plan. Their findings show that enrollment in the retirement
plan increases for treated individuals as well as their peers. Beshears et al. (2015)
find that information about the saving behavior of peers a↵ects retirement savings.
Our results show that the information letters a↵ect private retirement savings.
The DiD results indicate that receiving the letter increases contributions to a private
retirement account. This e↵ect is statistically significant and fairly sizable – about
40 EUR per year at the higher age cuto↵ and 20 EUR per year at the lower cuto↵.
These values represent 33% and 16%, respectively, of the average age-group specific
post-reform savings. The e↵ects on other variables such as subsidies received by the
government or the amount of deductible expenses are also positive and consistent
with our main e↵ect on private retirement contributions. All DiD results are robust
to the choice of the age bandwidth. Triple DiDs, where we use other age groups
for placebo DiDs, also indicate that the letters increase savings. The results from
event study estimates confirm the DiD findings. Our estimates for extensive margin
responses show that the share of taxpayers with positive Riester savings increases
by 4%-points at the higher age cuto↵ and 1%-point at the lower cuto↵, relative to
the control group. All our findings indicate that the letter e↵ects are smaller, yet
significant, at the lower age cuto↵ compared to the older one; retirement contribu-
tions of younger individuals are less responsive to the information. This may either
suggest that younger individuals, who are more than 30 years away from retiring,
do not plan far ahead, or they do not have su cient levels of income to save through
private retirement accounts.
How are these extra savings a↵orded and what are the ”behavioral” mecha-
nisms behind our results? First, we show that receiving the letters has a negative
e↵ect on charitable donations, suggesting that part of the savings response crowds
out donations. We also find some evidence that labor supply is increased in response
to the letters. Second, we presume that our main results are driven by a combination
of information and salience e↵ects. We study married couples to disentangle these
two mechanisms. The rationale behind this approach is that the younger couple in
a married couple receives the treatment letter after the older partner. Hence, the
letter of an older partner makes the issue salient to the younger partner without
providing personalized information. Our findings suggest that both mechanisms
contribute to the observed e↵ect on private retirement savings.
Our study relates to an increasing literature finding that seemingly irrelevant
factors – at least irrelevant in the neoclassical context – can help to improve respon-
siveness to and compliance with institutional policies (see related literature discussed
above). Although the theoretical mechanisms behind many of such findings are still
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not fully understood in the literature, a series of papers, including ours, now provide
robust evidence that non-traditional policies such as changing defaults, information
provision or the level of salience can have significant e↵ects on retirement savings
and, more broadly, individual behavior (see Chetty 2015 for a more detailed discus-
sion on the policy implications of ”behavioral” results). The findings in our paper,
along with the related literature, have important policy implications. One lesson
may be that governments may wish to provide better and more transparent infor-
mation about their policies in general and about retirement systems in particular in
order to achieve desired political goals such as increased savings rates. The partic-
ular findings of the pension-payment information letters that we study also inform
governments in other countries, which followed the German example and introduced
comparable letters.5
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional
details of the German pension system and the reform that we exploit in this paper.
We provide information about the data, outcome variables and some basic summary
statistics in Section 3, and the empirical strategy is discussed in Section 4. Our main
results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses potential mechanisms behind
the treatment e↵ect, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Institutional Background
The retirement system in Germany. The German pension system, which had
traditionally been dominated by a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme (the so-
called Bismarckian system which was implemented in the late 19th century), has
been transformed into a three-pillar system over the last decades (see ’Riester pen-
sion reform’ in the next paragraph).6 The first pillar comprises the traditional
government-organized statutory pension insurance system based on PAYG. The sec-
ond pillar is based on occupational pension plans, where employers support employ-
ees in forming retirement payments. The focus of our paper is on the interaction
between receiving information about the first pillar and own contributions to the
third pillar: private pension plans, where individuals are themselves responsible for
building up financial reserves for retirement.
5Other countries with similar letters include the USA, Finland, Sweden and France. See Larsson
et al. (2009) and the (German-language) overview in Schulz-Weidner (2012).
6The mandatory retirement age was 65 during the period of our analysis with few possibilities
for early retirement at the age of 63.
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Riester pension plans. In 2001, the German government passed the so-called
’Riester’ pension reform (named after Walter Riester who was the minister responsi-
ble for the reform) that strengthened the second and third pillar by partially substi-
tuting PAYG financed pensions with funded pensions (see Boersch-Supan et al. 2015
for an overview). While insurance through the statutory pension insurance scheme
is compulsory for employees in Germany, signing a contract for a private pension
scheme in the second and third pillar of the Germany pension system is voluntary.
Both the second and third pillar are subsidized to incentivize personal responsibil-
ity and compensate for decreasing statutory pensions. For the second pillar, the
reform introduced the legal right to convert salary into pension contributions and
thus make them exempt from income taxation and social insurance contributions
(deferred taxation). For the third pillar, Riester pension plans have been introduced.
The contributions to these Riester pension contracts are our outcomes of interest
(note that we do not exploit the 2001 reform in our paper; we study the e↵ect of
information letters which were sent out since 2004 on Riester contributions). Table 1
gives an overview of the Riester subsidy scheme.
Contributions to a Riester retirement account are directly subsidized with a
basic subsidy and an additional child subsidy for individuals with children.7 In order
to receive the maximum direct subsidy, individuals have to contribute a certain share
of their gross earnings to the retirement account.8 In addition to the direct subsidy,
contributions to Riester pension plans can be deducted from the income tax.9 The
overall subsidy is the sum of the direct subsidies and the tax allowance.10
7The maximum basic subsidy has been raised from 38 Euro in 2002/2003 to 154 Euro from
2008 onwards. It is twice as large for married couples if they sign two separate Riester contracts.
Contributors who have children additionally receive a child subsidy, which was 46 Euro per child
in 2002/2003 and has been raised to 185 Euro (300 Euro for children born after 2007).
8This contributed amount has to be 4 % (since 2008, it has been increased from 1% since 2001)
of gross earnings but not more than 2100 Euro. Direct subsidies received are counted as part of
the contribution. It is possible to contribute more than the maximum amount to the retirement
account but that does not increase the subsidy. The subsidies are proportionally reduced if the
total contribution (own contribution + direct subsidies) is below the required contribution for the
maximum direct subsidies.
9See Doerrenberg et al. (2016) for an overview of the German personal income tax and deduction
possibilities. The deduction is capped at a maximum amount which has been raised from 525 Euro
in 2002/2003 to 2100 Euro in 2008. The tax deduction is calculated as the di↵erence between the
regular tax burden without a Riester contract and an adjusted tax burden with a Riester contract.
The direct subsidy is added to the latter.
10For illustrative purposes, consider the following example (Corneo et al. 2015): A childless
single has gross earnings of 60,000 Euro in 2008 and the tax rate is 50%. The regular tax liability
without a Riester contract is 30,000 Euro. The maximum subsidized saving amount is 2,100 Euro,
i.e. min(60, 000 ⇥ 0.04, 2100). In order to receive the maximum basic subsidy of 154 Euro, the
own contribution has to be 1,946 Euro (= 2100   154). The adjusted tax burden amounts to
(60, 000 2, 100)⇥0.5+154 = 29, 104 Euro. The tax allowance then equals 30, 000 29, 104 = 896
Euro, and the overall subsidy is 154 + 896 = 1, 050 Euro.
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The treatment: information letters. One important component of the 2001
pension reform was the decision to send out annual pension information letters as
of January 2004. The purpose of these letters is to provide a solid basis for retire-
ment planning decisions and to increase awareness for the need of private retirement
savings. With their introduction, the German government thus took account of the
increased information needs of the population that arose as a consequence of the
new structure and more complex design of the German pension system.11
The pension information letters are sent to every insured person that fulfills
two eligibility criteria: the individual (i) has to be 27 or older and (ii) must have
paid social security contributions for at least five years. Civil servants and those
self-employed that are not insured in the German statutory pension insurance do not
receive information letters. The information letters complement so-called pension
statements that have been sent to insured people aged 55 or older already before
the introduction of the new letters and that still exist today. Pension statements
contain more detailed information, for example on covered earnings, and replace the
information letter in three-year intervals at the age of 55, 58, 61 and 64. The new
pension information letters have been gradually introduced. The test phase started
in the second half of 2002 when one sixth of all eligible people received a letter. In
2003, information letters were sent to another one third of eligible individuals. The
test phase ended in 2004 when the remaining 50% of the insured received a letter.12
As of 2005, the statutory pension insurance scheme has sent annual letters to all
insured that are eligible.13
The letters contain a rich set of information and are written in a comprehen-
sible way – comparable to the annual Social Security Statement in the US (Mas-
trobuoni 2011). Figures 1, 2, and 3 show an example of an information letter along
with explanations of the most relevant parts of the letter. The letter, for example,
includes information about the pension an individual would receive today in case
of immediate full disability as well as current accrued and expected future pension
rights. The latter are calculated based on the assumption that future earnings cor-
respond to the average earnings of the previous 5-year period. In the basic scenario,
there is no future adjustment of pensions taken into account. In two additional sce-
11Haupt (2014) provides survey evidence that Germans indeed think that the pension system is
very complex and complicated. Below we show some evidence that a vast majority of individuals
tend to overestimate their expected pensions.
12Unfortunately, the pension administration did not provide information on the criteria of how
individuals were selected into the three di↵erent years. Because some individuals have been treated
earlier than 2004, we will underestimate the true e↵ect of the pension letters.
13Note that pension statements could be requested prior to the reform. Since March 2012,
insured people have the additional possibility to access their information letter online at any time.
As of 2016, about 42 million information letters are sent out every year.
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narios, future accrued pension rights are calculated based on assumed yearly pension
adjustments of one and two per cent. It is explicitly stated that future pension ad-
justments are uncertain from today’s perspective and that the adjustment factor
does not account for the loss in purchasing power.14 The letters further contain
information about pension contributions paid so far and resulting earnings points
that determine future pension rights. The letter also provides information about
the growing pension gap which follows from the fact that future pensions will grow
with a lower rate than wages. The importance of additional retirement savings is
emphasized together with the note to account for the loss in purchasing power when
planning for old-age provision.
3 Data, Outcomes and Summary Statistics
Data set. We use the German Taxpayer Panel, an administrative data set col-
lected by German tax authorities. Provided and administered by the German Fed-
eral Statistical O ce, the data set is based on the universe of personal income tax
returns (Kriete-Dodds and Vorgrimler 2007). The unit of observation is the tax-
payer, i.e., either a single individual or a couple filing jointly. The data set is a
balanced panel covering all German tax units filing tax returns in the period 2001
to 2010. We have access to a 5% stratified random sample of the Taxpayer Panel
and employ the respective population weights provided by the Statistical O ce in
all calculations. The statistical o ce only provides the data set as a balanced panel
(as a putative service to the researchers), which implies that it only includes tax-
payers that file a tax return in all ten years of the panel. The data contain all
information necessary to calculate a taxpayer’s annual income tax, this includes
basic socio-demographic characteristics such as birth date, gender, family status,
number of children as well as detailed information on income sources and tax base
parameters such as work-related expenses and deductions.15
Outcome Variables. We study the e↵ect of the pension information letters on
various outcome variables included in the tax return data. The main outcome vari-
able throughout the paper is the contribution to a Riester pension account (excluding
subsidies). Because the unit observation is the taxpayer, either singles or couples,
14The pension adjustment primarily depends on the development of gross wages in Germany.
Additional factors that are taken into account are changes in the contribution rate for the German
statutory pension insurance scheme and the ratio of contributors and recipients (the latter known
as the so-called sustainability factor).
15Doerrenberg et al. (2016), for example, use the same data (in the context of the elasticity of
taxable income).
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in case of married couples our outcome variable is the sum of Riester savings by the
wife and the husband. We also study the e↵ects on other variables, some of which
are mechanically related with the Riester contributions: total direct subsidies, i.e.
the sum of the basic and the child subsidy, the special expense deduction, the tax
allowance as well as the total subsidy (see above for the detailed meanings of these
variables and how they are related). All outcome variables provide information
whether pension information letters induce their recipients to change savings in Ri-
ester pension plans at the intensive saving margin. We also explore if the extensive
margin of savings, i.e., whether to contribute to the Riester pension scheme account
or not, is a↵ected by the information letters.
Note that we do not observe contributions to occupational pension schemes,
the second pillar of the German pension system, in the tax data. The reason is
that they are directly deducted from gross income by the employer and hence do
not appear in the income tax data. To shed some additional light on our findings,
we also study if any changes in retirement savings change labor earnings (due to
increased labor supply) or come at the expense of altered charitable donations.
Sample selection. The sample is restricted to taxpayers who are between 16 and
70 years of age. We have to exclude a few observations due to data errors; these
particularly include individuals with implausible values in demographics (changing
date of births or gender). In years were individuals do not report any Riester savings,
these variable are coded as zero. Our final sample for analysis includes about 7.15
million observations, implying that we can rely on 715,000 observations per year.
Summary statistics. Table 2 shows summary statistics for the total contributions
to the Riester retirement account and the share of all taxpayers who save through
this scheme. Given that the reform was implemented in 2001, it is not surprising
that the share of Riester savers increased substantially between 2002 and 2010 from
4.8% to 20.2%. Accordingly, the average total amount contributions to the Riester
account also increased during this time span. For example, average contributions
(including zeros for individuals who did not have a Riester account) rose from 14
EUR in 2002 to 209 EUR in 2010. The summary statistics for the other savings
variables, shown in Table 3, show a similar overall time trend.
The strictly increasing trend over time shows the importance of establishing a
credible identification strategy to study the e↵ects of the pension-information letters;
a simple before-after analysis will be confounded by the overall time trend.
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4 Empirical Strategy
We use two strategies to identify the e↵ect of the information letters on retirement
savings. (i) a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) approach where we exploit that some
age groups started to receive letters whereas others either never receive a letter or
have already received a letter before the reform. (ii) An event-study design which
uses that di↵erent taxpayers at the young age cuto↵ start receiving letters at di↵erent
points of time.
Note that we do not observe in our tax return data whether an individual
actually received a letter. Assignment to treatment (i.e., receiving a letter) is based
on the eligibility criteria to receive the letter (in particular age and year) and not ac-
tual treatment.16 Hence, we might assign someone to the treatment group although
she has not received a letter. This implies that we estimate an intention-to-treat
(ITT) e↵ect rather than a conventional treatment e↵ect. This ITT underestimates
the e↵ect relative to a situation where assignment to the treatment groups is based
on actually receiving a letter.
4.1 Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences
We use the discontinuities in receiving a treatment letter at the age cuto↵s to set up
a DiD. For the lower age cuto↵, we use the group of individuals between 22 and 26
years old, who never receive a treatment letter, as a control group for individuals,
who are between 27 and 30 years old and who are subject to the 2004 reform of
sending out information letters. More precisely, we study how the savings behavior
of untreated individuals between 22-26 years of age develop over time (2001-2010),
and compare this development to the development over time of individuals between
27-30 years old who started to receive letters upon the reform (since 2004). An
individual i is in the control group in year t if she is 22-26 years old in t, and she is
in the treatment group in t if she is 27-30 years in t; this implies that we track age
groups over time (also see footnote 18).17 We define the treatment group like this in
order to have comparable subjects in the treatment and control groups in each year.
If we had included all (older) workers who started to receive a letter in the course
of the reform, we would have compared individuals who are significantly closer to
retirement to the control group of relatively young individuals. In robustness checks,
we vary the bandwidths around the cuto↵; in some regressions, we for example only
16Note that due to data limitations (our data starts in 2001) we can only check if individuals
paid social insurance contributions in 3 years before the 2004 reform.
17In the case of couples, we use the age of the older spouse to define the treatment and control
status of the couple. Recall that the data set is on the tax-unit level.
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compare 26 year old individuals to 27 year old ones.
The approach for the other age cuto↵ is comparable: We form a control group
of individuals who are between 55-60. These individuals have always (before and
after the reform) received pension statements and the information letters therefore
do not cause a shock in information and salience. The treatment group consists of
individuals who are 50-54 years old and started to receive information letters in the
course of the reform. We again form age bandwidths in order to have comparable
individuals in both groups, and we vary the bandwidths around the cuto↵.
The identifying assumptions of our design are usual for any DiD: the savings
behavior of control and treatment groups would have developed similarly over time
in the absence of the reform. Figures 4 and 5 plot the yearly average private savings
of the control and treatment groups over the time span 2001-2010 for the lower and
higher age cut o↵, respectively.18 Unfortunately, we do not have more pre-treatment
years in our data, but the graphs yet show that the averages developed similarly in
treatment and control groups before all eligible individuals started to receive letters
in 2004. We discuss the figure and results in more detail in Section 5.
The corresponding DID-regression equation that we estimate reads as follows:
 it = ↵ +   · Treatit +   · (Treat · Post)it + ⌘t +Xit + ✏it, (1)
where subscripts indicate an individual i in year t. The dependent variable  it stands
for one of the outcome variables that measure private savings of person i in year
t (see above for a description of our outcome variables). Post indicates the years
after the reform; this dummy is set equal to one for all years after 2003. Treat is
an indicator variable for an individual’s treatment status (with Treat = 0: control
group, and Treat = 1: treatment group). An individual i is in the treatment group
in year t if she is between 27 and 30 (at the lower cut o↵) or 50-54 (at the higher
age cut o↵) in this year. Individuals in the control group are 22-26 and 55-60 years
old, respectively.19 ⌘t is a set of year fixed e↵ects. The variable of interest is the
interaction between the treatment group indicator and the indicator for the post-
treatment years: (Treat · Post). The coe cient,  , for this interaction indicates
the di↵erential evolutions of savings before and after the reform for the respective
treatment group relative to its respective control group. That is, these are the usual
18That is, we collapse private savings by age group and year and plot the resulting averages in
each year. Note that this implies that the group of individuals included in each of the averages is
not necessarily the same.
19That is, we only have comparable persons in our regressions; individuals who are younger than
22 or older than 30 (at the lower cut o↵) or younger than 50 and older than 60 (at the higher cut
o↵) in year t are not part of the analysis in this year.
DiD coe cients that indicate if savings in the treatment group evolved di↵erently
than the control group’s savings. We add a vector of control variables Xit which
includes income, marital status, the number of children, and a dummy indicating
East vs West Germany. ✏it is an error term. We use standard OLS regressions and
cluster standard errors on the taxpayer level.
4.2 Event Study
In the DiD approach, we do not track the same individuals over time: for example,
individuals included in the 27-30-years group in 2001 are di↵erent from those in
the 27-30-years group in 2010. This approach is advantageous because comparable
people – in terms of age and therefore years until retirement – are in the control and
treatment group, respectively. However, the strategy does not allow controlling for
time-invariant individual e↵ects. Therefore, as a complement to the DiD approach,
we also implement an event study design using within-person variation over time, i.e.
controlling for individual fixed e↵ects. Di↵erent individuals experience an “event”
in di↵erent years. By construction, this research design can only be implemented
at the young cuto↵ since at the older cuto↵s, all individuals receive the letter in
2004. As before, the sample is restricted to taxpayers who are between 23 and 30
years old. We define an event by constructing a dummy variable indicating if an
individual i received a letter in year t for the first time.
Formally, we estimate the following non-parametric regression equation:
 it = ↵ +
3X
k= 2
 k ·  i(t+k) + ⌘t +  i + ✏it, (2)
where  i is a full set of person fixed e↵ects and ⌘t are year fixed e↵ects.20 As
before,  it is the amount of private savings of person i in year t. The explanatory
variables of interest are the event time indicators,  i(t+k), a set of dummy variables
that capture the years before and after individual i experienced the event. Dummy
 i(t+k) equals one if individual i receives a letter in t   k for the first time. The
dummy variable indicating the year prior to the reform,  i(t 1), is omitted from the
estimation, implying that all e↵ects are relative to the year before the reform. The
control group for an individual receiving a letter for the first time in a given year
consists of individuals who receive the letter in some other year. The identifying
assumption behind this approach is that the point of time of receiving the letter is
20Note that the individual fixed e↵ects along with the year fixed e↵ects implicitly control for
age e↵ects. This is important as savings are correlated with age and we have to rule out that we
capture the mere e↵ect of becoming older.
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not systematically related to retirement-saving behavior. We plot the coe cients of
the   dummies to detect any pre-trends that could harm this identifying assumption,
and to see if, and how quickly, the letters a↵ect savings.
5 Results
Unconditional Means over Time. We begin by plotting the raw di↵erence in
retirement Riester savings between treatment and control groups around the two age
cuto↵s (Figures 4 and 5). The figures show the di↵erence in unconditional means,
i.e. including zeros for those tax units that did not have a Riester account and not
conditioning on any control variables.
The figures show that the groups di↵er only slightly in the level of (Riester)
retirement savings before the reform. At the lower age cuto↵, the 27-30 year-olds
contribute an average of 15.3 EUR and 18.7 EUR in 2002 and 2003, compared with
9.6 EUR and 12.0 EUR for the 23- to 26-year-olds. The di↵erence increases by
only 2 EUR (=7.7 EUR - 5.7 EUR) in the two pre-reform years. The increase is
not significantly di↵erent from zero, i.e. the common trend assumption cannot be
rejected in these two years. In the first two years after the introduction of the
pension information letters (2004-2005), the di↵erence then increases to 13.4 EUR.
While fairly small in absolute terms, the e↵ect of the letters amounts to 216% of
the di↵erence in the two pre-reform years. Starting in 2006, the di↵erence between
treatment and control group becomes even bigger and increases to 32.1 EUR on
average over 2006-2010. The increase in the di↵erence compared with the pre-reform
period is statistically significant at the 5% level in all but the last year (2010) of the
observation period.21 Comparing the entire pre- and post-reform periods results in
an unconditional DiD value of 20.5 EUR at the lower cuto↵.
At the age cuto↵ of 55 years, the e↵ect of the pension information letters is
even more pronounced (see Figure 5). Here, it is the younger group that has the
higher level of retirement savings throughout. Before the reform, the di↵erence
amounts to 5.7 EUR in 2002 and to 7.7 EUR in 2003. This is a time when only
the 55- to 59-year-olds receive information about their future pensions. By 2004, all
50- to 54-year-olds have received pension information letters for the first time. In
this and the following year, the di↵erence between the two groups increases to 16.6
EUR on average. As for the younger age cuto↵, the di↵erence becomes much larger
21In our balanced panel, a tax unit is only included in the data if it is observed in all years from
2001 to 2010. So all 26-year-olds that we observe in 2010 already filed a tax declaration in 2001,
at age 17; this is a very small group. Accordingly, the standard errors increase substantially in the
later years.
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after 2006. The average di↵erence for the years 2006-2010 is 58.5 EUR. Compared
with the average pre-reform di↵erence of 6.7 EUR, this is an increase by a factor
of 8.7. As the restriction that arises from the balancing of the sample is much less
important for the older age groups, the di↵erence is estimated precisely even in the
last years of the observation period. The simple DiD based on raw means is 39.5
EUR at the older cuto↵.
The size of the di↵erences may not appear large at first glance, but they are
quite substantial in relative terms. The average amount of Riester savings in the
age group 23-30 in the post-reform period is 150.6 EUR. The unconditional DiD
e↵ect of 20.5 EUR represents 13.6% of this average. For the age group 50-59, the
post-reform average is 129.5 EUR, suggesting that the letter e↵ects corresponds to
30.5% of the group-specific post average.
DiD Regressions. In a next step, we run DiD regressions with controls for in-
come, residence in West Germany, marital status, and the number of children. We
also include year dummies to account for common time-specific e↵ects. The regres-
sion results for the lower age cuto↵ are displayed in Table 5 and the results for the
upper cuto↵ are in Table 6.
The estimates in column 4 of Table 5 are based on the same definition of
the treatment and controls groups as in the unconditional DiD estimates discussed
above: we compare individuals aged 27-30 (treatment group) with individuals aged
23-26 (control group). The coe cient of interest is the interaction between the
treatment and post-reform indicators. The estimate is 23.8, suggesting that the
pre-vs-post letter di↵erence in Riester savings is 23.8 EUR larger in the treatment
group than in the control group. The regression estimate is very close to the raw
DiD estimate of 20.5 EUR.
In the remaining columns 1-3, we reduce the bandwidth around the age cuto↵
in order to explore if the estimated e↵ect is sensitive to the definition of the treatment
and control group. In our strictest definition (column 1), we compare only individ-
uals aged 27 (treatment group) with individuals aged 26 (control group), thereby
mitigating concerns about unobserved time-variant influences that are specific to
each group. For this narrow age range, we find a treatment e↵ect of 16.1 EUR.22
22To address concerns that the two groups were subject to unobserved age-specific shocks, we
also compute (unconditional) triple-di↵erence estimates (DDD). Individuals aged 31-39 are used as
a comparison group for the younger age range (23-26). People aged 35-40 are in the fake treatment
group, and individuals aged 31-34 are in the fake control group. The DiD estimate in this fake
experiment is found to be 13.0, yielding a DDD estimate of 7.5 EUR (=20.5 - 13.0 EUR). For the
older age range (50-59), we use people aged 41-49 for the comparison, with individuals aged 41-44
in the fake treatment group. Here, the DDD estimate is found to be 27.8 EUR (=39.5 - 11.7). So
while in both cases the DDD estimates are smaller than the DiD coe cients, the positive savings
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As noted above, this e↵ect is relatively sizeable. For the age group 23-29,
average Riester savings in the post-reform period are 150.6 EUR per year, so a
treatment e↵ect of 23.8 EUR corresponds to 15.8% of the average. For the narrower
age bracket, the e↵ect of 16.1 EUR is still equivalent to 10.7% of the average.
Turning to the upper age cuto↵ in Table 6, we see in column 4 that the
regression estimate is again very close to the unconditional DiD estimate (42.4 EUR
vs. 39.5 EUR). As before, the remaining columns 1-3 are devoted to reducing the
bandwidth around the age cuto↵ that is used to define treatment and control groups.
The treatment e↵ect for the strictest comparison (54- vs. 55-year-olds) is 10.8 EUR.
The post-reform average for Riester savings among the age group 50-59 is 128.7 EUR,
so the treatment e↵ect represents between 8.4% and 32.9% of this amount.
Intensive and Extensive Margins. Table 7 shows regression results for the
subsample of tax units with positive Riester contributions. For this group, the
letter leads to a stronger absolute increase in savings than for the overall sample.
At the lower cuto↵, we estimate a DiD e↵ect of 40.2 EUR; at the older age cuto↵,
the DiD estimate is 57.9 EUR. In relative terms, the e↵ect at the intensive margin
is a little weaker than the overall e↵ect. Among the group of Riester savers, average
post-reform savings are 638.5 EUR per year for the age group 23-30, and 843.1 EUR
for the age group 50-59. The treatment e↵ects at the intensive margin correspond
to 5.3% and 9.9% of these averages.
To assess the reaction at the extensive margin, we estimate DiD regressions in
which we use a dummy indicating whether a taxpayer has positive Riester savings
as the dependent variable (Table 8). Columns 1 and 2 are devoted to the younger
cuto↵, while columns 3 and 4 shows coe cients for the upper age cuto↵. For younger
individuals, the letter increases the probability to have Riester savings by 1%-point.
This estimate is independent of the bandwidth around the age cuto↵. At the older
cuto↵, we see an increase of the probability of being a Riester contributor by 4%-
points if the 50-59 year group is considered. Using the smaller bandwidth of one
year around the cuto↵ reduces the coe cient to 1%-point. As shown in Table 2, the
share of Riester savers among all taxpayers was around 5% in 2002/03 and then rose
to about 20% in 2010. The post-letter average (between 2004 and 2010) is 15.2%.
This implies that the increases by 4%-points and 1%-points in response to the letter
represent 26% and 6.6% of the post-reform shares.
Other Outcome Variables. Our main results, where we use the contributions
to the Riester account, are consistent with the findings for other private savings
e↵ect of the letters is confirmed.
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variables variables (as described in Section 3). The regression results for other
outcome variables are displayed in Table 9 for the lower age cuto↵ and Table 10 for
the upper cuto↵. The e↵ects for all outcome variables are positive and statistically
significant at both age cuto↵s. We again see that the treatment e↵ects are higher
for the older taxpayers relative to the younger ones.
6 Discussion
Our analyses so far show that the information letters increase private pension con-
tributions. In this section, we explore some of the mechanisms behind this result
and present a few additional findings. In particular, we explore the lagged response
that we observe, argue that both salience and information drive the savings e↵ect,
document the reaction of other outcomes (labor earnings and charitable donations),
and point out that low-income households (for whom the additional savings would
be most important) react least strongly to the information letters.
6.1 Why the stronger increase after 2006?
Why does in Figures 4-6 the biggest increase occur only in 2006, i.e. two years after
the introduction of the information letters? We see three potential reasons for this.
First, government support for Riester pension savings became more generous
in this year: while the basic subsidy for a single adult was 76 EUR per year in
2004/2005, the amount increased to 114 EUR in 2006. Likewise, the maximum
amount for the special expense deduction was raised from 1,050 to 1,575 EUR. In
both cases, the increase amounts to 50% of the 2005 value. For our two treatment
groups, the percentage increase in the (unconditional) DiD estimates between 2005
and 2006 is higher than these 50%: for the younger age group, the increase is 101%
(from 14.7 to 29.6 EUR), and for the older age group, we observe an increase of
123% (from 18.0 to 40.2 EUR). This suggests that the acceleration in 2006 is not
entirely driven by the change in the Riester rules – which anyway are the same for
both treatment and control group.
A second, complementary explanation for the stronger increase in 2006 is that
many people do not immediately change their behavior when they receive the letter.
There is a time lag as people collect information about the best savings scheme
among the dozens of o↵ers from di↵erent financial institutions. While this alone
could mainly explain why the reaction in 2005 is a little stronger than in 2004, an
explanation for an even bigger time lag might be that some people will not react to
the first letter, but only to the second or third one.
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Finally, especially at the younger age cuto↵, there could be a composition e↵ect
at play that is specific to our dataset. As noted, in the later years of our observation
period, the sample size becomes much smaller for the two younger groups because
the dataset only includes tax units that file tax declarations in all years from 2001
to 2010. For the 50-to-59-year-olds in 2001, this is hardly a restriction as they are
at their prime working age over the ten subsequent years. By contrast, the 27- to
30-year-olds observed in 2010 must have filed a tax declaration already in 2001,
when they were between 18 and 21 years old. So in later years the individuals in
this group are more likely to have actually received the letter.23 They also have
higher incomes on average and, by virtue of having been on the labor market for
more years, are probably more mature when it comes to making financial decisions.
As shown in Figure 7, an event-study regression exploiting that di↵erent indi-
viduals receive the letter for the first time in di↵erent years confirms that it takes
two years before individuals fully respond to the first receipt of the letter. This is
in line with both a lagged and a cumulative response, but cannot be driven by the
composition e↵ect alone as the event study considers only variation within individ-
uals over time. Reassuringly, the size of the e↵ect based on the event-study strategy
is very similar to the DiD estimates.
6.2 Salience versus Information
There are two potential mechanisms through which the letter may have an e↵ect on
savings: it may present new information about the pension system in general and
especially about individuals’ own future pension entitlements, and it may make the
issue of saving for retirement more salient. We argue in the following that, at least
in the context of our application, both mechanisms contribute to the e↵ect.
Information. If individuals had no information or wrong expectations about their
future pension level, the information provided in the letter may lead to an adjust-
ment of savings behavior. A natural question to ask is whether the personalized
pension information in the treatment letters constitutes a positive or negative shock
to pension expectations, relative to the priors and expectations before receiving the
letter. If individuals have accurate expectations or if they underestimate the public
pension they can expect in old-age, the (first) receipt of the letter should not provide
new information nudging people to engage in additional private retirement savings.
Things are di↵erent, though, if people overestimate their future pension claims.
23Recall that we do not directly observe this in the data.
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Existing evidence on the accuracy of pension expectations in the German con-
text is scarce. Haupt (2014) shows that almost 85% of the respondents of the
German SAVE survey in 2011 state that they find the information on their pro-
jected public pension reported in the pension information letter “(very) helpful”.
Pension projections are considered to be the most important information in the in-
formation letter.24 This indicates that a significant fraction of respondents had some
uncertainty about their pension claims prior to receiving the information letter.
To shed some light on the accuracy of pension expectations, we exploit data
from the “Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe” (SHARE) that
can be linked to administrative records from the German Pension Insurance.25 We
calculate the expected net pension based on the reported expected net replacement
rate and net earnings of the respondents and compare this expected pension with
the projected value respondents obtain in their pension information letter.26
Table 4 reports the share of survey respondents that overestimate their pro-
jected public pension at mandatory (column 1) and expected (column 2) retirement
age. We focus on the first two waves of the SHARE survey from 2004 and 2006/2007
as these years correspond with the savings data we exploit in our main empirical
analysis. We find that the share of respondents overestimating their projected pen-
sion at mandatory retirement age slightly declines from 61.3% in wave 1 to 57.9%
in wave 2. Interestingly, this share remains constant at roughly 71% when we com-
pare respondent’s pension expectations with the projected pension at their expected
retirement age. Our results suggest that there is a tendency to overestimate pro-
24Haupt (2014) reports that 77% of the SAVE respondents find the information on the projected
disability pension “helpful” or “very helpful”, 60% the information on potential pension adjust-
ments, 55% the hint on additional need for private retirement savings, and 48% the information
on the loss in purchasing power.
25SHARE is a cross-national panel survey with a focus on the old-age population. The survey
contains a question on the expected net replacement rate of the statutory pension insurance. The
question reads: “Thinking about the year when you will collect this pension, approximately, what
percentage of your last net earnings will your public old age pension amount to?”
26The administrative records contain all relevant information on the earnings biography of the
SHARE survey respondents and their accumulated pension rights to simulate the projected public
pension that appears in the pension information letter. As described above, the letter reports a
projected public pension which is based on the current accrued and expected future pension rights
assuming that future earnings equal those in the previous 5-year period prior to receiving the
letter. In the information letter, it is explicitly stated that social insurance contributions for public
health and nursing care and, if applicable, income taxes need to be deducted from the reported
gross pension in order to obtain the net pension. Therefore, we simulate both the projected gross
and net pension. The projected public pension reported in the information letter is based on
the assumption that the insured person retires at the mandatory retirement age. It could be the
case, however, that respondents plan to retire before reaching the mandatory retirement age when
answering the question on the expected replacement rate of their public pension. In this case, they
have to accept deductions due to early retirement. We therefore additionally simulate a projected
pension if people retire at their stated expected retirement age.
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jected public pensions, even though one should bear in mind the small number of
observations (N=111 in wave 1 and N= 152 in wave 2).
Salience. In addition to this information channel, the letters may have an e↵ect
because they make the issue of retirement savings more salient. Receiving the letter
may bring the issue of retirement on the table and nudge people to think about their
retirement plan. In principle, salience alone could a↵ect savings even if the letters
did not include any new information to the taxpayers. A large literature, especially
in behavioral economics, has shown that increased salience and simple nudges af-
fect behavior in many contexts, even in the absence of additional information or
changing other things that would matter in a standard economic framework. Many
applications that provide evidence on the e↵ectiveness of nudges and salience are
based on simple reminder letters, suggesting that the letters that we study may also
work similarly (examples of this vast literature include Altmann and Traxler 2014
and Karlan et al. 2016; see also the book by Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Both channels matter. Additional estimates (now again based on our main data
set, the German Taxpayer Panel) suggest that in our application, both channels
typically matter for the e↵ect on savings. To show this, we consider only (married)
couples, but record the Riester savings of husbands and wives separately instead of
adding them up as in our main analysis. We also split the sample into couples in
which the husband is older than the wife and couples in which the wife is older.
In Table 11, the dependent variable are the Riester savings of the husband. In
couples in which the husband is older than the wife (Panel A), the husband receives
the letter before the wife. In these cases, we cannot distinguish between salience
and information e↵ects on the husband’s savings. The overall e↵ect of the letter is
17.5 EUR in the age range 23-30, and 35.4 EUR in the age range 50-59. In couples
in which the wife is older (Panel B), she receives a letter while the husband does not.
We nevertheless see a savings’ reaction also for the husband, which is consistent with
a (pure) salience e↵ect. While this salience e↵ect is statistically significant only for
the age group 50-59, a similar analysis for the savings of the wife yields significant
DiD estimates for both age groups (Panel B of Table 12).27
27Note that these additional estimates are only suggestive. First, there are cases in which the
wife is older than the husband but in which both spouses receive their first information letters in
the same year. There are various ways in which we can define the groups so that the salience e↵ect
is indeed pure, but then the sample becomes too small to draw meaningful conclusions, especially
in the younger age range. Second, we assume that the savings of the husband are only a↵ected by
his wife’s letter through salience and not through additional information. However, suppose that
the letter to the wife reveals that she has less pension payments than expected. This update in
information may induce the husband to save more. In the (West) German context this should be
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6.3 Labor earnings go up, charitable donations decrease
The increased amount of savings in the Riester account may result from a reduction
in consumption, an increase in income, or the crowing-out of other forms of savings
or of charitable donations. Unfortunately, our dataset only allows us to test two of
these channels.
The e↵ects on charitable donations are shown in Table 13. At the lower age
cuto↵ (column 1), the letter leads to a reduction in charitable donations of 8.4
EUR. In light of the savings e↵ect of 23.8 EUR that we found for this group, this
result suggests that about one third of the savings response comes at the expense
of lower charitable donations. At the upper cuto↵ (column 2), the coe cient for
charitable donations is -25.4 EUR. Given the overall savings e↵ect of 42.4 EUR,
this coe cient suggests that more than 50% of the savings response is driven by
reduced charitable donations. However, the coe cient for charitable donations is
not statistically significant in this case.
The e↵ects of the letters on gross labor earnings are displayed in Table 14. The
results indicate that the treatment letters have a positive e↵ect on gross earnings.
This is consistent with the fact that most households used to overestimate their
statutory pension entitlements; increasing labor earnings is then one way to directly
increase these entitlements but also to finance additional retirement savings. The
e↵ect is quite substantial: the DiD estimates are 2520 EUR per year at the lower age
cuto↵ and 1839 EUR at the higher age cuto↵. These are the e↵ects at the household
level, so for couples this is the e↵ect on the sum of the earnings of both spouses.
6.4 Poorer households react less strongly
A major motivation for both the introduction of the Riester pension scheme and the
sending out of pension information letters was the concern that statutory pensions
alone will no longer be su cient to guarantee an adequate income during old age.
However, low-income households not only have low entitlements in the statutory
pension system, but also save relatively little through the Riester scheme, thus
leaving a substantial amount of public subsidies on the table. As Corneo et al.
(2015) show, “38% of the aggregate subsidy accrues to the top two deciles of the
population, but only 7.3% to the bottom two” (p.1). This di↵erential take-up is of
obvious social policy concern.
Our analysis suggests that the Riester savings of low-income households also
only a relatively minor issue, especially for the older age group, as husbands are typically the main
breadwinners. Then again, couples in which the wife is older than husband may be atypical in this
respect.
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react less strongly to the introduction of pension information letters (cf. Figure 6).
The di↵erence is sizeable: for the older age range, the unconditional DiD estimate
in 2006 is close to 60 EUR for households with an annual income of more than
60,000 EUR per year, but only about 20 EUR for households with an income of
between 10,000 and 30,000 EUR.28 However, these results alone cannot establish
whether the di↵erence arises because poorer households cannot a↵ord the additional
savings or whether the information letters do not address their informational needs
well enough. We leave this question to future research.
7 Conclusion
As of 2004, the German pension authority started to send out annual letters that
informed about the pension systems and provided personalized information about
(expected) future pension payments. These letters presumably increased the level of
information about pensions and made the issue of retirement savings more salient,
motivating us to hypothesize that contributions to a private retirement account
are a↵ected by the letters. In light of a strong positive time trend of retirement
savings for all groups of individuals, we exploit two discontinuities in the age cuto↵s
of receiving such a letter and an event study design to estimate the e↵ect of the
letter. Using administrative tax-record data, we find that the letters increase private
pension savings. Using average savings in the retirement account as a benchmark,
the e↵ects appear quite sizable.
We further find evidence that a substantial part of the increase in savings is
due to a crowding out of charitable donations. The letter most likely a↵ects savings
by increasing the level of information about the retirement system and the expected
pension level and through bringing the topic of retirement savings to the attention
of the letter recipients. Using married couples where one partner receives the letter
earlier, we find some evidence that the information is the main driver of the e↵ect at
the younger age cuto↵, while both, information and salience, seem to play a role for
the older taxpayers. However, as we discuss, there are shortcomings in the approach,
so these last results should be treated with caution.
While disentangling the two channels is certainly desirable to learn more about
the behavioral mechanisms behind such a ”less traditional” policy, our findings have
practical value even in the absence of a proper separation of the two channels. In-
creasing private retirement savings is a policy goal and most academic economists
28We do not distinguish by income for the younger age range because there is much less variation
here (esp. for the age range 23-26). There is also less reason for concern as incomes at this age are
only a weak predictor of life-time incomes.
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would agree that it is necessary to maintain retirement systems. Our findings pro-
vide guidance how policies could be designed that e↵ectively increase savings. In
emphasizing the practical value of our findings even in the absence of a clear-cut
identification of the exact mechanisms, we adopt the ”pragmatic perspective” of
Chetty (2015, page 14) who, in the context of the positive saving e↵ect of default
changes, stresses that ”given an exogenous policy objective of increasing saving, this
empirical finding has practical value even if the underlying behavioral assumptions
remain debated.”
References
Altmann, S. and C. Traxler (2014). Nudges at the dentist. European Economic
Review 72, 19 – 38.
Benartzi, S. and R. H. Thaler (2013). Behavioral economics and the retirement
savings crisis. Science 339 (6124), 1152–1153.
Beshears, J., J. J. Choi, D. Laibson, B. C. Madrian, and K. L. Milkman (2015).
The e↵ect of providing peer information on retirement savings decisions. The
Journal of Finance 70 (3), 1161–1201.
Bhargava, S. and D. Manoli (2015). Psychological frictions and the incomplete
take-up of social benefits: Evidence from an irs field experiment. American
Economic Review 105 (11), 3489–3529.
Boersch-Supan, A., T. Bucher-Koenen, M. Coppola, and B. Lamla (2015). Savings
in times of demographic change: Lessons from the German experience. Journal
of Economic Surveys 29 (4), 807–829.
Boersch-Supan, A., M. Coppola, and A. Reil-Held (2012, April). Riester Pensions
in Germany: Design, Dynamics, Targetting Success and Crowding-In. NBER
Working Paper 18014.
Chetty, R. (2015). Behavioral economics and public policy: A pragmatic perspec-
tive. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 105 (5), 1–33.
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, S. Leth-Petersen, T. H. Nielsen, and T. Olsen (2014).
Active vs. passive decisions and crowd-out in retirement savings accounts:
Evidence from denmark. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (3), 1141–
1219.
Chetty, R., A. Looney, and K. Kroft (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and
evidence. American Economic Review 99 (4), 1145–77.
21
Corneo, G., C. Schro¨der, and J. Ko¨nig (2015). Distributional e↵ects of subsidiz-
ing retirement savings accounts: Evidence from Germany. Freie Univ. Berlin,
School of Business & Economics, Discussion Paper 2015/18.
Doerrenberg, P., A. Peichl, and S. Siegloch (2016). The elasticity of taxable income
in the presence of deduction possibilities. Journal of Public Economics , –.
Forthcoming.
Duflo, E. and E. Saez (2003). The role of information and social interactions in
retirement plan decisions: Evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118 (3), 815–842.
Finkelstein, A. (2009). E-ztax: Tax salience and tax rates. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 124 (3), 969–1010.
German Federal Government (2012). Ergaenzender Bericht der Bundesregierung
zum Rentenversicherungsbericht 2012 und Gutachten des Sozialbeirats zum
Rentenversicherungsbericht 2012 und zum Alterssicherungsbericht 2012.
Available online: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/117/1711741.
pdf.
Goda, G. S., C. F. Manchester, and A. J. Sojourner (2014). What will my account
really be worth? experimental evidence on how retirement income projections
a↵ect saving. Journal of Public Economics 119, 80 – 92.
Haupt, M. (2014). Die Renteninformation - Eine Evaluation aus verhal-
tensoekonomischer Perspektive. Sozialer Fortschritt 63, 42–51.
Karlan, D., M. McConnell, S. Mullainathan, and J. Zinman (2016). Getting to
the top of mind: How reminders increase saving. Management Science. forth-
coming.
Kriete-Dodds, S. and D. Vorgrimler (2007). The German Taxpayer-Panel.
Schmollers Jahrbuch 127 (3), 497–509.
Larsson, L., A. Sunde´n, and O. Settergren (2009). Pension information: The
annual statement at a glance. OECD Journal: General Papers 3, 131–171.
Madrian, B. C. and D. F. Shea (2001). The power of suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) participation and savings behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 116 (4), 1149–1187.
Mastrobuoni, G. (2011). The role of information for retirement behavior: Evidence
based on the stepwise introduction of the social security statement. Journal
of Public Economics 95 (7-8), 913 – 925.
22
Poterba, J. (2014). Retirement security in an aging population. American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings 104 (5), 1–30.
Schulz-Weidner, W. (2012). Altersvorsorgeinformation im europaeischen Vergle-
ich – zwischen Transparenz und Spekulation. Deutsche Rentenversicherung
(DRV) 02/2012.
Thaler, R. H. and S. Benartzi (2004). Save more tomorrow: Using behavioral
economics to increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy 112 (S1),
S164–S187.
Thaler, R. H. and C. R. Sunstein (2008). Nudge. Yale University Press.
23
Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 1: The treatment letter: overview
Notes: The Figure depicts an example of an original pension-information letter (in German).
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Figure 2: The treatment letter: explanations (I)
Notes: The Figure provides explanations for some of the most relevant parts of the pension-information letters.
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Figure 3: The treatment letter: explanations (II)
Notes: The Figure provides explanations for some of the most relevant parts of the pension-information letters.
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Figure 4: Raw di↵erences between age groups over time - lower age cuto↵
Notes: The Figure depicts the di↵erence in contributions to Riester account between control and treatment group
over time. The control group consists of individuals 23-26 years old and the treatment group consists of individuals
27-30 years old. More specifically, the dot in the Figure in year t is based on the di↵erence between the average of
individuals who are 27-30 (50-54) in year t and the average of individuals who are 23-26 (55-59) in year t. That is,
the graph tracks age groups over time. Information letters – the treatment – were started to sent out annually in
2004. The unit is Euro. No control variables included. Data come from German tax returns.
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Figure 5: Raw di↵erences between age groups over time - upper age cuto↵
Notes: The Figure depicts the di↵erence in contributions to Riester account between control and treatment group
over time. The control group consists of individuals 55-59 years old and the treatment group consists of individuals
50-54 years old. More specifically, the dot in the Figure in year t is based on the di↵erence between the average of
individuals who are 27-30 (50-54) in year t and the average of individuals who are 23-26 (55-59) in year t. That is,
the graph tracks age groups over time. Information letters – the treatment – were started to sent out annually in
2004. The unit is Euro. No control variables included. Data come from German tax returns.
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Figure 6: DiD Graphs: Heterogeneous e↵ects by income - upper age cuto↵
Notes: The Figure documents the heterogeneity of the DiD e↵ects by income. The graphs are from three separate
estimations, for households with low (10,000-30,000 euros per year), middle (30,000-60,000 euros) and high (more
than 60,000 euros per year) income. Each dot represents the average di↵erence between the treatment group (50-
54 years old) and the control group (55-59 years old). No control variables included. Information letters – the
treatment – were started to sent out annually in 2004. Data source: German Taxpayer Panel (2001-2010).
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Figure 7: Event Study – pre and post letters
Notes: Event Study based on equation 1. The sample includes individuals between 23 and 30 years
old. Outcome variable is contributions to a ’Riester’ savings account.
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Tables
Table 1: Riester subsidy scheme
Year Required contribution for maximum Basic subsidy Child subsidy Maximum special expense
direct subsidy (% of gross earnings) (Euro p.a.) (Euro p.a.) deduction (Euro p.a.)
2002/2003 1 38 46 525
2004/2005 2 76 92 1050
2006/2007 3 114 138 1575
since 2008 4 154 185⇤ 2100
Notes: The table is based on Boersch-Supan et al. (2012). Riester contracts require a minimum
contribution which has been 60 Euro since 2005. From 2002 to 2004, it was 45 Euro (without
children), 38 Euro (one child) or 30 Euro (more than one child). ⇤The child subsidy is 300 Euro
for children born after 2007.
Table 2: Riester Savings by year: Average amount and share of savers
Year Riester contributions (EUR) Share of Riester savers (in %)
2002 14.02 04.76
2003 19.22 05.97
2004 37.15 07.45
2005 48.86 09.61
2006 93.85 13.35
2007 124.11 16.91
2008 181.90 18.88
2009 195.30 19.71
2010 208.73 20.19
Notes: Summary statistics by year for the average amount of Riester savings (including zeros)
and the share (in %) of individuals with a positive Riester payment. The sample includes all
individuals in the data set, N = 715, 832 in each year.
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Table 3: Riester Savings by year: Other savings variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var Direct Subsidy Deduction Allowance Total Subsidy
2002 4.71 16.61 1.69 6.38
2003 6.31 22.62 2.35 8.64
2004 14.48 49.56 4.75 19.18
2005 18.60 65.04 6.14 24.67
2006 38.07 130.74 12.62 50.55
2007 47.84 172.99 17.68 65.35
2008 73.04 257.06 26.85 99.65
2009 75.19 274.25 29.69 104.78
2010 76.64 293.32 31.70 108.04
Notes: Summary statistics by year for all outcome variables in the regression analyses. (1): total
direct subsidies, (2) special expense deduction, (3): tax allowance, (4) total subsidy. All in EUR.
The sample includes all individuals in the data set, N = 715, 832 in each year.
Table 4: Pension expectations
Wave/Year Share of respondents overestimating projected Share of respondents overestimating projected
pension at mandatory retirement age (in %) pension at expected retirement age (in %)
Wave 1 (2004) 61.3 71.2
Wave 2 (2006/2007) 57.9 71.1
Notes: Own calculations based on SHARE and SHARE-RV. The sample consists of non-retired
survey respondents in dependent employment who answered the survey questions on the amount
of their net income, their expected net replacement rate of the public pension and their expected
retirement age and who agreed that their answers to the SHARE survey questions can be linked
to administrative records of the German pension insurance (SHARE-RV). N = 111 in wave 1 and
N = 152 in wave 2. The average age of respondents is 55 (age range from 42 to 64) in wave 1 and
56 (age range from 48 to 65) in wave 2.
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Table 5: DiD estimates - lower age cuto↵ - by age bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Contributions to Retirement Account
Age range 26-27 25-28 24-29 23-30
Post ⇥ Treat 16.08*** 14.26*** 19.99*** 23.81***
(2.91) (2.73) (2.85) (2.89)
Treat -0.05 -0.29 -1.49** -1.82**
(1.09) (0.77) (0.76) (0.85)
West Germany 9.25*** 8.05*** 5.66** 3.13
(3.45) (3.03) (2.76) (2.70)
Married 21.77*** 23.70*** 22.93*** 28.96***
(5.39) (4.45) (3.69) (3.61)
Children -16.88*** -21.03*** -22.39*** -25.49***
(5.45) (4.53) (3.93) (3.65)
Income 1.40* 1.11* 1.44** 1.66**
(0.82) (0.62) (0.70) (0.65)
Treat group 27 27-28 27-29 27-30
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
Obs. 42709 88204 137147 185261
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Contributions to private retire-
ment account (’Riester’). Lower age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information
letter. Di↵erent age bandwidths around the cuto↵ to define treatment and control group: 26 vs
27; 25-26 vs. 27-28; 24-26 vs. 27-29; 23-26 vs 27-30. The treatment letters were started to sent
out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was a test phase before and we therefore exclude
the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while
post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between
the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating the post-reform years. This coe cient esti-
mates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement savings between the treatment and control
group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and clustered on the tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** <
0.01. Data come from German tax returns, 2001-2010.
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Table 6: DiD estimates - higher age cuto↵ - by age bandwidth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Contributions to Retirement Account
Age Range 54-55 53-56 52-57 50-59
Post ⇥ Treat 10.77*** 17.51*** 26.02*** 42.41***
(2.20) (1.90) (2.01) (2.00)
Treat -2.45 -0.75 -0.70 -1.41**
(1.52) (0.88) (0.66) (0.55)
West Germany -52.28*** -51.07*** -49.62*** -48.05***
(3.71) (3.33) (3.01) (2.55)
Married 42.07*** 41.13*** 39.90*** 39.52***
(2.97) (2.63) (2.38) (2.00)
Children 44.95*** 43.58*** 43.36*** 42.78***
(3.27) (2.89) (2.59) (2.14)
Income 0.61*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.47***
0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
Treat group 54 53-54 52-54 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Obs. 327991 666450 1000868 1634586
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Contributions to private retire-
ment account (’Riester’). Higher age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information
letter. Di↵erent age bandwidths around the cuto↵ to define treatment and control group: 54 vs
55; 53-54 vs 55-56; 52-54 vs 55-57; 50-54 vs 55-59. The treatment letters were started to sent out
to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was a test phase before and we therefore exclude the
year 2003 from the estimations, implying that pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-
reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between the
treatment indicator and the dummy indicating the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates
the di↵erential evolution in private retirement savings between the treatment and control group
after the treatment. Coe cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered on the tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Data come from German tax returns, 2001-2010.
34
Table 7: DiD estimates - lower and higher age cuto↵ - Contributions to Riester
retirement account - Conditional on positive Riester contributions
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Riester retirement contributions
Age range 23-30 50-59
Post ⇥ Treat 40.24*** 57.91*
(15.47) (29.95)
Treat 35.31** -54.15*
(14.50) (28.61)
West Germany 108.60*** 240.89***
(15.04) (12.17)
Married -28.12 38.52***
(32.14) (14.77)
Children -144.13*** -168.56***
(23.54) (10.99)
Income 107.58*** 23.07***
(16.15) (4.46)
Treat group 27-30 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.282 0.123
Obs. 19997 189749
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Contributions to Riester retir-
ment account. Sample restricted to taxpayers with positive Riester contributions. Lower and
upper age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information letter. Treatment and control
ages: 23-26 vs 27-30; 50-54 vs 55-59. The treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible
individuals since 2004. There was a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003
from the estimations, implying that pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform
years are 2004-2010. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between the treat-
ment indicator and the dummy indicating the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the
di↵erential evolution in private retirement savings between the treatment and control group after
the treatment. Coe cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust
and clustered on the tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data
come from German tax returns, 2001-2010.
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Table 8: DiD estimates - lower and higher age cuto↵ - extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Extensive Margin
Contributing to Retirement Account
Age range 23-30 26-27 50-59 54-55
Post ⇥ Treat 0.01** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Treat -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
West Germany -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.11***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Married 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Children 0.02*** 0.02** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Treat group 27-30 27 50-54 54
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07
Obs. 185261 42709 1634586 327991
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Dummy variable indicating
positive contributions to private retirement account (’Riester’). Lower age and upper cuto↵. The
treatment is receiving a pension information letter. Di↵erent age bandwidths around the cuto↵
to define treatment and control group: 26 vs 27; 23-26 vs 27-30; 54 vs 55; 50-54 vs 55-59. The
treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was a
test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that
pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory
variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating
the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement
savings between the treatment and control group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the
e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the tax unit level.
Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German tax returns,
2001-2010.
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Table 9: DiD estimates - lower age cuto↵ - di↵erent savings variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Direct Subsidy Deduction Allowance Total Subsidy
Age range 23-30 23-30 23-30 23-30
Post ⇥ Treat 6.21*** 30.28*** 6.38*** 12.53***
(0.55) (3.20) (0.65) (1.03)
Treat -4.71*** -7.24*** 1.25*** -3.45***
(0.25) (0.96) (0.20) (0.34)
West Germany -4.46*** -1.85 4.74*** 0.37
(0.66) (3.14) (0.58) (1.02)
Married 13.59*** 42.17*** 2.30*** 15.86***
(0.77) (4.05) (0.82) (1.32)
Children 28.72*** 6.07 -17.31*** 11.33***
1.15) (4.39) (0.76) (1.51)
Income 0.07** 1.67** 0.60** 0.66**
(0.03) (0.66) (0.23) (0.26)
Treat group 27-30 27-30 27-30 27-30
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.12
Obs. 185261 185261 185261 185261
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variables: (1): total direct subsidies,
(2) special expense deduction, (3): tax allowance, (4) total subsidy. Lower age cuto↵. The
treatment is receiving a pension information letter. Treatment and control ages: 23-26 vs 27-30.
The treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was
a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that
pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory
variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating
the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement
savings between the treatment and control group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the
e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the tax unit level.
Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German tax returns,
2001-2010.
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Table 10: DiD estimates - higher age cuto↵ - di↵erent savings variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Direct Subsidy Deduction Allowance Total Subsidy
Age range 50-59 50-59 50-59 50-59
Post ⇥ Treat 19.76*** 63.84*** 6.46*** 26.16***
(0.53) (2.28) (0.41) (0.78)
Treat -3.51*** -4.87*** 0.83*** -2.67***
(0.17) (0.57) (0.09) (0.21)
West Germany -7.21*** -52.76*** -4.64*** -11.67***
(0.58) (2.87) (0.51) (0.92)
Married 22.82*** 66.91*** 1.95*** 24.66***
(0.40) (2.23) (0.47) (0.75)
Children 51.87*** 96.43*** -4.76*** 46.96***
(0.65) (2.54) (0.43) (0.89)
Income 0.02*** 0.43*** 0.22*** 0.24***
(0.01) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Treat group 50-54 50-54 50-54 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.08
Obs. 1634586 1634586 1634586 1634586
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variables: (1): total direct subsidies,
(2) special expense deduction, (3): tax allowance, (4) total subsidy. Upper age cuto↵. The
treatment is receiving a pension information letter. Treatment and control ages: 50-54 vs 55-59.
The treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was
a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that
pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory
variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating
the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement
savings between the treatment and control group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the
e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the tax unit level.
Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German tax returns,
2001-2010.
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Table 11: DiD Estimates: Salience vs Info - Savings of the Husband
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Riester Savings of Husband
Age range 23-30 50-59
Panel A: Salience and Information E↵ect
Husband older than wife
Post ⇥ Treat 17.53** 35.42***
(7.73) (2.03)
Treat -0.55 -2.48***
(1.44) (0.56)
Adj. R2 0.11 0.04
Obs. 20871 997955
Panel B: Salience E↵ect
Wife older than husband
Post ⇥ Treat 1.14 18.28***
(1.12) (4.92)
Treat 3.56* -3.89**
(2.16) ( 1.55)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.03
Obs. 4329 191846
Treat group 27-30 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes
Controls yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Contributions to private re-
tirement account (’Riester’) of the husband. Married couples where either the husband is older
than the wife or vice versa. Lower and higher age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension
information letter. The treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible individuals since
2004. There was a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations,
implying that pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010.
The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the
dummy indicating the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in
private retirement savings between the treatment and control group after the treatment. Coe -
cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the
tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German
tax returns, 2001-2010.
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Table 12: DiD Estimates: Salience vs Info - Savings of the Wife
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Riester Savings of Wife
Age range 23-30 50-59
Panel A: Salience and Information E↵ect
Wife older than husband
Post ⇥ Treat 14.36 21.62***
(8.82) (3.21)
Treat 0.94 -3.19***
(1.62) (0.88)
Adj. R2 0.109 0.042
Obs. 4314 190283
Panel B: Salience
Husband older than wife
Post ⇥ Treat 15.21*** 10.48***
(3.87) (1.49)
Treat 0.47 -1.88***
(0.85) (0.36)
Adj. R2 0.082 0.045
Obs. 20795 989524
Treat group 27-30 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes
Controls yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Contributions to private retire-
ment account (’Riester’) of the wife. Married couples where either the husband is older than the
wife or vice versa. Lower and higher age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information
letter. The treatment letters were started to sent out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There
was a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that
pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory
variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating
the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement
savings between the treatment and control group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the
e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on the tax unit level.
Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German tax returns,
2001-2010.
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Table 13: DiD estimates - lower and higher age cuto↵ - Charitable donations
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Donations
Age range 23-30 50-59
Post ⇥ Treat -8.43*** -25.37
(2.83) (22.27)
Treat 3.60 -1.91
(4.08) (20.25)
West Germany 8.89** -106.49
(4.49) (66.59)
Married 20.15** -229.95***
(8.50) (86.42)
Children 4.71 -116.10*
(5.36) (66.21)
Income 14.95** 147.76***
(6.24) (47.55)
Treat group 27-30 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.04 0.17
Obs. 185261 1634536
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Charitable Donations. Lower
and upper age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information letter. Treatment and
control ages: 23-26 vs 27-30; 50-54 vs 55-59. The treatment letters were started to sent out to all
eligible individuals since 2004. There was a test phase before and we therefore exclude the year
2003 from the estimations, implying that pre-reform years include 2001 and 2002, while post-
reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between the
treatment indicator and the dummy indicating the post-reform years. This coe cient estimates
the di↵erential evolution in private retirement savings between the treatment and control group
after the treatment. Coe cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered on the tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Data come from German tax returns, 2001-2010.
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Table 14: DiD estimates - lower and higher age cuto↵ - Labor earnings
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Labor Earnings
Age range 23-30 50-59
Post ⇥ Treat 2520.00***1839.83***
(207.64) (295.87)
Treat 5018.06***1517.02***
(152.68) (245.48)
West Germany 6101.87***9334.72***
(141.27) (176.77)
Married 16400.47***21596.79***
(201.03) (159.18)
Children -7505.06***6904.15***
(197.43) (163.47)
Treat group 27-30 50-54
Year F.E. yes yes
Pre years 2001-02 2001-02
Post years 2004-10 2004-10
Adj. R2 0.15 0.051
Obs. 185276 1634740
Notes: DiD regressions based on equation 1. Outcome variable: Gross yearly labor earnings
of tax unit. Lower and upper age cuto↵. The treatment is receiving a pension information
letter. Treatment and control ages: 23-26 vs 27-30; 50-54 vs 55-59. The treatment letters were
started to sent out to all eligible individuals since 2004. There was a test phase before and we
therefore exclude the year 2003 from the estimations, implying that pre-reform years include
2001 and 2002, while post-reform years are 2004-2010. The explanatory variable of interest is the
interaction between the treatment indicator and the dummy indicating the post-reform years. This
coe cient estimates the di↵erential evolution in private retirement savings between the treatment
and control group after the treatment. Coe cients measure the e↵ect in Euro. Standard errors
in parentheses are robust and clustered on the tax unit level. Significance levels are * < 0.1, **
< 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data come from German tax returns, 2001-2010.
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